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In this paper, we employ a calibrated two-country version of the New Area-Wide Model
(NAWM) currently under development at the European Central Bank to examine the
potential beneﬁts and spillovers of reducing labour-market distortions caused by euro
area tax structures. Our analysis shows that lowering tax distortions to levels prevail-
ing in the United States would result in an increase in hours worked and output by
more than 10 percent. At the same time, tax reductions would have positive spillovers
to the euro area’s trade partners, bolstering the case for tax reforms from a global
perspective. Finally, we illustrate that, in the presence of heterogeneous households,
distributional eﬀects may be of importance when gauging the impact of tax reforms.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E32, E62
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April 2007Non-Technical Summary
What are the important driving forces and economic mechanisms behind the cross-country
diﬀerences in labour utilisation that have emerged over the recent decades? This question
has triggered an intense debate about institutions versus preferences as potential explana-
tions of lower labour utilisation in Europe relative to the United States. Prescott (2004)
argues forcefully that institutions, and in particular taxes on labour income, are the main
explanation for lower labour utilisation in Europe, as measured by the average number of
hours worked. In contrast, Blanchard (2004) suggests that European preferences for leisure
are an important determinant of the observed downward trend in hours worked. Similarly,
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2006) claim that Europeans work much less because of the
inﬂuence of trade unions in the seventies, eighties and part of the nineties (partly reﬂect-
ing preferences for social cohesion) and because of widespread labour-market regulations
creating disincentives to work.
In this paper, we start from Prescott’s (2004) analysis and ask the counterfactual ques-
tion of what would happen in terms of hours worked and overall economic performance if
the labour-market distortions originating in European tax structures were to be reduced to
levels prevailing in the United States. In answering this question, we focus on three ma-
jor government revenue components that drive a wedge between the eﬀective consumption
wage of households (the purchasing power of the after-tax wage) and the eﬀective labour
cost of ﬁrms: income taxes, social security contributions (both employers’ and employees’),
and indirect taxes on consumption goods. The size and composition of this tax wedge diﬀer
markedly across the euro area and the United States. While the overall tax wedge in the
euro area currently amounts to roughly 64 percent of the earnings of an average production
worker, that of the United States is limited to about 37 percent. Also, the way governments
raise revenue diﬀers considerably across the euro area and the United States, with employ-
ers’ social security contributions for example accounting for 22 percent of earnings in the
euro area versus 7 percent in the United States.
To examine the eﬀects of reducing labour-market distortions caused by euro area tax
structures, we employ a calibrated two-country version of the New Area-Wide Model
(NAWM) currently under development at the European Central Bank. Our analysis using
the NAWM conﬁrms the widely-held view that reductions in tax distortions have beneﬁcial
eﬀects on labour-market outcomes and general economic performance. In fact, lowering
5
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April 2007euro area tax wedges to levels prevailing in the United States is found to result in a rise in
hours worked and output by more than 10 percent in the long run. At the same time, our
analysis shows that tax reforms aimed at reducing labour-market distortions would have
beneﬁcial spillovers to the euro area’s trade partners, bolstering the case for such reforms
from a global perspective. Finally, we illustrate that, in the presence of heterogeneous
households, distributional eﬀects may be of importance when gauging the macroeconomic
impact of tax reforms.
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What are the important driving forces and economic mechanisms behind the cross-country
diﬀerences in labour utilisation that have emerged over the recent decades? This question
has triggered an intense debate about institutions versus preferences as potential explana-
tions of lower labour utilisation in Europe relative to the United States. Prescott (2004)
argues forcefully that institutions, and in particular taxes on labour income, are the main
explanation for lower labour utilisation in Europe, as measured by the average number of
hours worked. In contrast, Blanchard (2004) suggests that European preferences for leisure
are an important determinant of the observed downward trend in hours worked. Similarly,
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2006) claim that Europeans work much less because of the
inﬂuence of trade unions in the seventies, eighties and part of the nineties (partly reﬂect-
ing preferences for social cohesion) and because of widespread labour-market regulations
creating disincentives to work.
In this paper, we start from Prescott’s (2004) analysis and ask the counterfactual ques-
tion of what would happen in terms of hours worked and overall economic performance if
the labour-market distortions originating in European tax structures were to be reduced
to levels prevailing in the United States. To answer this question, we employ a calibrated
two-country version of the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) currently under development
at the European Central Bank.1 The speciﬁcation of the NAWM builds on recent advances
in developing micro-founded DSGE models suitable for quantitative policy analysis, as ex-
empliﬁed by the closed-economy model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2003), the
International Monetary Fund’s Global Economy Model (GEM; cf. Bayoumi, Laxton and
Pesenti, 2004) or the Federal Reserve Board’s new open economy model named SIGMA
(cf. Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust, 2005). Thus, it incorporates numerous nominal and real
rigidities in an eﬀort to improve its empirical ﬁt regarding both the domestic and interna-
tional dimension. The employed version of the NAWM consists of two symmetric countries
of diﬀerent size: the euro area and the United States, the latter representing the rest of the
1The existing Area-Wide Model (AWM; cf. Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2001) is a traditional macroecono-
metric model for the euro area, which features Keynesian behaviour in the short run, with output determined
by aggregate demand, and is classical in the long run, with output determined by aggregate supply.
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assets, allowing for imperfect exchange-rate pass-through and ﬁnancial intermediation costs.
Thus, the model permits us to also gauge the international repercussions that may arise
from the reduction of labour-market distortions.2
In addition, building on Coenen and Straub (2005), the NAWM features two distinct
types of households which diﬀer with respect to their ability to participate in asset markets,
with one type of household only holding money as opposed to also trading bonds and
accumulating physical capital.3 Due to the existence of these two types of households,
ﬁscal policies other than government spending—notably transfers—have real eﬀects even
though both types of households are optimising subject to intertemporal budget constraints.
Indeed, transfer policies are found to have noticeable income eﬀects, in particular if the
distribution of transfers across households is skewed towards those that are constrained
regarding their ability to access asset markets.4 At the same time, with an empirically
realistic share of constrained households equal to 25 percent, the NAWM does not generate
the magnitude and persistence of the crowding-in eﬀect on consumption that some empirical
studies have documented (see, e.g., Perotti, 2004, and Mountford and Uhlig, 2005), at least
for sample periods preceding the 1990s. As regards the labour market, it is assumed that
both types of households supply diﬀerentiated labour services and act as wage setters in
monopolistically competitive markets by charging a markup over their marginal rate of
substitution. Speciﬁcally, wage setting is characterised by sticky nominal wages ` al aC a l v o
(1983) as well as indexation, resulting in two separate wage Phillips curves.5
2Focusing on tax reforms aimed at replacing a country’s tax on capital income with a consumption tax,
Mendoza and Tesar (1998) show that the ability to borrow from abroad reduces the transition costs and
shifts some of the burden of the adjustment onto the rest of the world. In more recent work, Mendoza and
Tesar (2003) consider the strategic interactions that are likely to result from the international externalities
of unilateral tax reforms. Such interactions are not addressed in the present study.
3As a result, also households with limited ability to participate in asset markets can intertemporally
smooth consumption by adjusting their holdings of money. In contrast, Coenen and Straub (2005) follow
Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es (2004) and assume that one group of households is subject to liquidity con-
straints and cannot even participate in the money market. These households follow a simple rule of thumb
and just consume their after-tax disposable income.
4Clearly, reality is more complex than the structure of the model suggests, as there are no pensions or
transfers schemes that are serving as automatic stabilisers.
5In Coenen and Straub (2005) it is assumed that the wage rates for the liquidity-constrained households
correspond to those optimally chosen by the unconstrained households, resulting in a single wage Phillips
curve. As we show below, depending on the type of structural shock, this assumption may lead to quite
diﬀerent response proﬁles of household-speciﬁc variables.
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various labour-market distortions originating in national tax structures. In this context, we
focus on three major government revenue components that drive a wedge between the eﬀec-
tive consumption wage of households (the purchasing power of the after-tax wage) and the
eﬀective labour cost of ﬁrms: income taxes, social security contributions (both employers’
and employees’), and indirect taxes on consumption goods. The size and composition of
this tax wedge diﬀer markedly across the euro area and the United States (see OECD, 2004a
and 2004b; and our own calculations presented below). While the overall tax wedge in the
euro area currently amounts to roughly 64 percent of the earnings of an average production
worker, that of the United States is limited to about 37 percent. Also, the way governments
raise revenue diﬀers considerably across the euro area and the United States, with employ-
ers’ social security contributions for example accounting for 22 percent of earnings in the
euro area versus 7 percent in the United States.
As argued by Prescott (2004), the existing large diﬀerences in the overall tax wedge
across the euro area and the United States (possibly more than its composition) should
essentially explain the euro area’s relatively poor performance in terms of labour utilisation
when compared to the United States. Indeed, many empirical studies (see for instance those
surveyed in IMF, 1999; European Commission, 2004; and Nickell, 2004) report detrimental
eﬀects of tax wedges on labour-market outcomes in Europe. Thus, lowering the euro area
tax wedge to the level prevailing in the United States ought to lead to a signiﬁcant rise
in labour utilisation and, thereby, to an improvement in overall economic performance.6
How a reduction in the tax wedge will exactly aﬀect labour utilisation and overall economic
performance, however, will largely depend on the particular characteristics of the economy,
notably the elasticity of labour supply and the details of the wage-setting process, but
also on how the implied losses in revenue are ﬁnanced and the importance of international
spillovers. Hence, a systematic quantitative assessment using a well-articulated dynamic
6Because of the assumed monopoly power of households, the implied steady-state wage markup introduces
another labour-market distortion. Thus, as shown in Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) for the euro area
and in Kilponen and Ripatti (2005) for Finland, a reduction in the wage markup would be conducive to
enhancing labour utilisation and overall economic performance, like a reduction in the tax wedge, even
though they have diﬀerent budgetary implications. Since the steady-state wage markup is isomorphic to the
tax wedge arising from labour income taxes and employees’ social security contributions, our study could
easily be extended to the case of reducing the steady-state wage markup as well.
9
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the eﬀects of tax reforms on labour-market performance.7
Our assessment based on the NAWM conﬁrms the widely-held view that reductions
in tax distortions have beneﬁcial eﬀects on labour-market outcomes and general economic
performance. In fact, lowering euro area tax wedges to levels prevailing in the United States
is found to result in a rise in hours worked and output by more than 10 percent in the long
run. At the same time, our analysis shows that tax reforms aimed at reducing labour-market
distortions would have beneﬁcial spillovers to the euro area’s trade partners, bolstering
the case for such reforms from a global perspective. Further, we demonstrate that the
existence of nominal and real rigidities results in plausible adjustment dynamics over short
to medium-term horizons following a reduction in tax distortions. In the absence of these
rigidities, a reduction in distortionary tax rates would lead to adjustment paths that are
characterised by sizeable impact responses and overshooting—outcomes that we consider as
rather unrealistic. For instance, if the favourable supply-side eﬀects were to be dominated by
demand eﬀects due to the implied increase in permanent income, pronounced inﬂationary
pressures would arise in the short to medium run, triggering an excessive tightening of
monetary policy. Finally, we illustrate that, in the presence of heterogeneous households,
distributional eﬀects may be of importance when gauging the macroeconomic impact of tax
reforms which, in the ﬁrst place, are designed to meet eﬃciency considerations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 brieﬂy characterises
historical developments in labour-market outcomes in the euro area relative to the United
States and documents cross-country diﬀerences in tax distortions. Section 3 outlines the
speciﬁcation of the NAWM, while Section 4 provides details on its calibration, together
with some dynamic simulations illustrating its dynamic properties. Section 5 employs the
NAWM to evaluate the beneﬁts and spillovers of reducing the labour-market distortions
caused by euro area tax structures to levels prevailing in the United States. Finally, Section 6
summarises our conclusions and suggests directions for future extensions.
7While our model accounts for labour-market frictions arising from monopolistic competition and sticky
nominal wages, a richer description of labour markets would include an explicit modelling of employment
choices (that is, the extensive margin of labour utilisation) and involuntary unemployment. Similarly, real
wage rigidities, bargaining and minimum wages all have implications for a policy design conducive to en-
hancing labour utilisation. The analysis of these features is beyond the scope of this study.
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While our ultimate objective is to assess the potential beneﬁts and spillovers of reducing
the tax distortions that have been identiﬁed as a main cause for the deterioration of labour-
market outcomes in the euro area, we start our analysis by reviewing some important facts
often cited to characterise the euro area’s rather poor labour-market performance when
compared to the United States. We also take stock of existing cross-country diﬀerences in
the tax wedges weighing on labour markets.
Figure 1: Hours Worked, Output and Productivity in the Euro Area, 1970–2004










Hours worked per capita










GDP per hour worked
GDP per capita
Note: The per-capita measures are based on working-age population aged 15 to 64.
Source: GGDC (2005) and own calculations.
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United States, Figure 1 depicts the time series for hours worked, output per capita and
labour productivity (measured as output per hour worked) over the period 1970 to 2004.
The upper panel of the ﬁgure reveals that, while average hours worked were roughly similar
at the start of the 1970s, there has been a notable secular downward trend for the euro area
thereafter. The lower panel shows that, although this downward trend has been paralleled
by a fairly steady increase in relative labour productivity, which eventually levelled oﬀ in the
mid-1990s, output per capita has remained largely stable over time at a level considerably
below that observed for the United States.8 Hence, had relative hours worked remained at
the level prevailing at the start of the 1970s, the euro area would have observed roughly the
same level of output per capita as did the United States over subsequent years. In other
words, the stable diﬀerence in output per capita would largely reﬂect the secular downward
trend in labour utilisation.
Prescott (2004) has argued that disparities in national tax structures constitute a key
factor in explaining such striking diﬀerences in labour utilisation and economic performance
in per-capita terms across the euro area and the United States. And indeed, focusing on
the three major government revenue components that drive a wedge between the eﬀective
consumption wage of households and the eﬀective labour cost of ﬁrms, Table 1 reveals
that tax wedges in the euro area are notably higher than in the United States: in 2004, the
overall tax wedge amounts to roughly 64 percent of the earnings of an average production
worker, while that in the United States is limited to about 37 percent. Thus, the euro
area has an overall tax wedge about 27 percentage points higher than that of the United
States.9 In addition, the way governments raise revenue diﬀers markedly across countries.
For example, most governments in the euro area have skewed social security contributions
heavily towards employers, compared with a balanced incidence in the United States: on
average, employers’ social security contributions in the euro area account for almost 22
8The more recent decline in relative productivity levels is not addressed here. This decline is most likely
attributable to a slowdown in productivity growth relative to the United States, while our study assumes
the existence of a stationary steady state.
9Notice that the diﬀerence between the tax wedges in the euro area and the United States has been
widening since the mid-1990s, mainly because of a rising tax wedge in the euro area: in 1994, the tax wedge
in the euro area totalled 55 percent, while it stood at 35 percent in the United States (cf. IMF, 1999).
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Consumption Income Social security contr. Overall
tax tax Employees Employers tax wedge
Euro area
Austria 20.0 8.4 14.0 22.5 64.9
Belgium 21.0 20.5 10.7 23.0 75.2
Finland 22.0 19.5 4.9 19.4 65.8
France 19.6 9.4 9.8 28.2 67.0
Germany 16.0 16.2 17.3 17.3 66.8
Greece 18.0 0.5 12.5 21.9 52.9
Ireland 21.0 9.6 4.5 9.7 44.8
Italy 20.0 14.0 6.9 24.9 65.8
Luxembourg 15.0 7.9 12.1 11.9 46.9
Netherlands 19.0 7.3 22.2 14.0 62.5
Portugal 19.0 5.1 21.1 17.0 62.2
Spain 16.0 9.7 4.9 23.4 54.0
Average 18.3 12.2 11.8 21.9 64.1
United States 7.7 15.4 7.1 7.1 37.3
Note: Data on consumption taxes are standard rates of VAT for the euro area member states and for the
United States the average of state plus maximum local sales tax rates calculated using 2004 GDP weights.
Data on labour income taxes and social security contributions (in percent of labour cost) are based on
single individuals without children at the income level of the average production worker denominated in
US Dollars with equal purchasing power. The overall tax wedge is deﬁned as the sum of the individual
tax wedges. The euro area average has been calculated using 2004 GDP weights at PPP exchange rates.
Source: OECD (2004a, 2004b), Tax Policy Center (2005) and own calculations.
percent of the earnings of an average production worker, which contrasts with little more
than 7 percent in the United States. Consequently, euro area governments tend to raise
a relatively high amount of revenue from non-wage labour costs adversely aﬀecting labour
demand.10 Similarly, euro area consumption taxes are found to be more than twice as high
as those in the United States.
To illustrate the potential importance of the documented tax wedges for explaining the
observed diﬀerences in labour utilisation between the euro area and the United States, it is
10Though in the long run we might expect non-wage labour costs to be borne fully by workers in the form
of lower wages—since capital is internationally mobile with equalised real rates of return—the adjustment
period following tax reforms aimed at reducing non-wage labour costs may be protracted reﬂecting the
existence of both nominal and real rigidities as well as other institutional impediments.
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anism. Speciﬁcally, consider the real eﬀective wage income of households (the purchasing
power of the after-tax wage), (1 − τN − τW h)W/((1 + τC)P), and the real eﬀective labour
cost of ﬁrms, (1+τW f)W/P, where W is the nominal wage rate and P denotes the aggregate
price level. The terms τN and τC are, respectively, the labour income and consumption
tax rates; and τW h and τW f are the rates of contribution to social security to be paid by
households and ﬁrms, respectively.
In equilibrium, the households’ real after-tax consumption wage equals the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, and the ﬁrms’ real eﬀective wage
cost equals the marginal product of labour. Hence, the tax and contribution rates induce a
wedge distorting the households’ consumption-leisure choice on the one side and the ﬁrms’
demand for labour (relative to that for capital) on the other. The overall tax wedge ¯ τ is
the ratio of the two relevant wage rates, or approximately, the sum of its components:
¯ τ =1 −
(1 − τN − τW h)
(1 + τC)(1+τW f)
≈ τC + τN + τW h + τW f,
which is conveniently used as a summary measure of the distortions adversely aﬀecting
labour utilisation.
Clearly, this simple static example, which focuses on the households’ intratemporal
consumption-leisure margin and the ﬁrms’ intratemptoral labour-capital margin, neglects
the intertemporal aspects associated with capital accumulation and the acquisition of foreign
assets. It also disregards distortions arising from monopolistic competition in the labour
market that would increase the real wage above the competitive level. Further, it does
not take into account the eﬀects of changes in both domestic and international relative
prices. Consequently, the static example ignores several potentially important economic
factors. Finally, it also does not provide insights into the transitional dynamics triggered
by reductions in the overall tax wedge and its components, as implied, for instance, by
nominal and real rigidities and the presence of adjustment costs. In the following section
we therefore outline a well-articulated dynamic model of the euro area and the United States
which we will employ as a laboratory for evaluating alternative scenarios aimed at reducing
the labour-market ineﬃciencies caused by euro area tax structures.
14
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 747 
April 20073 A Model of the Euro Area and the United States
The model consists of two symmetric countries of normalised population size s and 1 − s,
respectively: the euro area, denoted as the home country, and the United States, repre-
senting the rest of the industrialised world and denoted as the foreign country. In each
country, there are four types of economic agents: households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal authority, and
a monetary authority. We further distinguish between two households which diﬀer with
respect to their ability to access ﬁnancial markets, with one household only holding money
as opposed to also trading bonds and accumulating physical capital. As regards ﬁrms, we
distinguish between producers of tradable diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and producers
of three non-tradable ﬁnal goods: a private consumption good, a private investment good,
and a public consumption good.
In the following, we outline the behaviour of the diﬀerent types of agents, characterise
the model’s aggregate outcomes and state the aggregate resource constraint which needs
to be satisﬁed in equilibrium. We focus on the exposition of the home country, with the
understanding that the foreign country is similarly characterised. To the extent needed,
foreign variables and parameters are indexed with an asterisk, ‘∗’.
3.1 Households
There are two households indexed by I and J. The members of household I are indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1−ω ]. They have access to ﬁnancial markets, where they buy and sell domestic
government bonds as well as internationally traded bonds, accumulate physical capital, the
services of which they rent out to ﬁrms, and hold money for transaction purposes. This
enables the members of household I to smooth their consumption proﬁle in response to
shocks. The members of household J are indexed by j ∈ (1− ω, 1]. They cannot trade in
ﬁnancial and physical assets. Nevertheless, they can intertemporally smooth consumption
by adjusting their holdings of money. The members of both households supply diﬀerenti-
ated labour services and act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive markets. As a
consequence, they supply suﬃcient labour services to satisfy labour demand.11
11In case no distinction between the two households needs to be made, household members will occasionally
be indexed by h ∈ [0, 1].
15
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Each member i of household I maximises its lifetime utility by choosing purchases of the
consumption good, Ci,t, purchases of the investment good, Ii,t, next period’s physical capital
stock, Ki,t+1, the intensity with which the existing capital stock is utilised, ui,t, next period’s
holdings of domestic government bonds as well as internationally traded bonds, Bi,t+1 and
BF
i,t+1, and current period’s holdings of money, Mi,t, given the following lifetime utility
function:
Et














where β is the discount factor, σ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and ζ is the inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀort with respect to the real
wage. The parameter κ measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption.
Thus, the utility of household member i depends positively on the diﬀerence between the
current level of individual consumption, Ci,t, and the lagged average consumption level of
household I as a whole, CI,t−1, and negatively on individual labour supply, Ni,t.
Household member i faces the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τC
t +Γ v(vi,t))PC,t Ci,t + PI,tIi,t (2)
+R−1
t Bi,t+1 + ((1 − ΓBF(BF
t ))RF,t)−1St BF
i,t+1 + Mi,t +Ξ i,t +Φ i,t
=( 1 − τN
t − τ
W h
t ) Wi,t Ni,t +( 1− τK
t )(RK,t ui,t − Γu(ui,t)PI,t)Ki,t
+τK
t δP I,tKi,t +( 1− τD
t )Di,t + TRi,t − Ti,t + Bi,t + St BF
i,t + Mi,t−1,
where PC,t and PI,t are the prices of a unit of the private consumption good and the
investment good, respectively. Rt and RF,t denote, respectively, the risk-less returns on
domestic government bonds and internationally traded bonds. Internationally traded bonds
are denominated in foreign currency and, thus, their domestic value depends on the nominal
exchange rate St (expressed in terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign currency).
Ni,t denotes the labour services provided to ﬁrms at wage rate Wi,t; RK,t indicates the rental
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that is, the inverse of the household member’s money-to-consumption ratio.
Similarly, ΓBF(BF
t ) (deﬁned in Appendix A.1) represents a ﬁnancial intermediation
premium that the household member must pay when taking a position in the international
bond market. The incurred premium is rebated in a lump-sum manner, being indicated by
Ξi,t.12 As regards the provision of eﬀective capital services, varying the intensity of capital
utilisation is subject to a proportional cost Γu(ui,t) (deﬁned in Appendix A.1).
The ﬁscal authority absorbs part of the gross income of the household member to ﬁnance
its expenditure. In this context, τC




t are the tax rates levied on the diﬀerent sources of household
income; that is, wage income Wi,t Ni,t, rental capital income RK,t Ki,t and dividend income
Di,t.13 Here, for simplicity, we assume that the utilisation cost of physical capital and
physical capital depreciation are exempted from taxation. τ
W h
t is the additional pay-roll tax
rate levied on household wage income (representing the household member’s contribution
to social security). The terms TRi,t and Ti,t indicate transfers received and lump-sum taxes
paid, respectively.
Finally, it is assumed that household member i holds state-contingent securities, Φi,t.
These securities are traded amongst members of household I and provide insurance against
individual wage-income risk. This guarantees that the marginal utility of consumption
out of wage income is identical across individual household members.14 As a result, all
household members will choose identical allocations in equilibrium.15
The capital stock owned by household member i evolves according to the following
capital accumulation equation,
Ki,t+1 =( 1 − δ)Ki,t +( 1− ΓI(Ii,t/Ii,t−1))Ii,t, (4)
12We assume that the members of the foreign household I
∗ are not subject to a ﬁnancial intermediation
premium when trading in international bonds.
13For simplicity, it is assumed that dividends are taxed at the household level.
14The existence of state-contingent securities is assumed for analytical convenience and renders the model
tractable under staggered wage setting when household members are supplying diﬀerentiated labour services.
15This in turn guarantees that Ci,t = CI,t in equilibrium.
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formulated in terms of changes in investment (deﬁned in Appendix A.1).
Choice of Allocations
Deﬁning as Λi,t/PC,t and Λi,t Qi,t the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget con-
straint (2) and the capital accumulation equation (4), respectively, the ﬁrst-order conditions
for maximising the household member’s lifetime utility function (1) with respect to Ci,t, Ii,t,
Ki,t+1, ui,t, Bi,t+1, BF
i,t+1 and Mi,t, are given by:
Λi,t =
(Ci,t − κC I,t−1)−σ
1+τC





































































=1 − Γ 
v(vi,t)v2
i,t. (11)
Here, Λi,t represents the shadow price of a unit of the consumption good expressed in terms
of consumption-based utility; that is, the marginal utility of consumption. Similarly, Qi,t
measures the shadow price of a unit of the investment good; that is, Tobin’s Q.16
16Notice that the ﬁrst-order condition (8) implies that the intensity of capital utilisation is identical across
household members; that is, ui,t = ut.
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ternationally traded bonds, (9) and (10), yields a risk-adjusted uncovered-interest-parity
condition, reﬂecting that the return on internationally traded bonds is subject to a ﬁnan-
cial intermediation premium.
Wage Setting
The members of household I act as wage setters for their diﬀerentiated labour services Ni,t
in monopolistically competitive markets. We assume that the wages for the diﬀerentiated
labour services, Wi,t, are determined by staggered nominal wage contracts ` a la Calvo (1983).
Thus, household members receive permission to optimally reset their nominal wage contract
in a given period t with probability 1 − ξI. All household members that receive such
permission choose the same wage rate ˜ WI,t = ˜ Wi,t. Those members that do not receive









that is, the wage contract is indexed to a geometric average of past changes in the price of
the private consumption good, PC,t, and the steady-state consumer-price inﬂation rate, πC,
where χI is an indexation parameter.
The members of household I that receive permission to optimally reset their wage con-
tracts in period t are assumed to maximise lifetime utility, as represented by equation (1),
taking into account the indexation scheme (12) and the demand for their labour services
(the formal derivation of which we postpone until we consider the ﬁrms’ problem).
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal wage-setting decision
in period t:
Et



























This expression states that in those labour markets in which wage contracts are re-
optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the household members’ discounted sum of
expected after-tax marginal revenues, expressed in consumption-based utility terms, Λi,t+k,
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labour, ∆i,t+k = −N
ζ
i,t+k. In the absence of wage staggering (ξI = 0), the factor ηI/(ηI −1)
represents the markup of the real after-tax wage over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure,17 reﬂecting the degree of monopoly power on the part of













Notice that the wage markup drives an additional wedge between the eﬀective consump-
tion wage and the marginal rate of substitution. Obviously, the distortions arising from the





The members of household J do not have access to capital and bond markets. Nevertheless,
they can intertemporally smooth consumption by adjusting their holdings of money. Thus,
using self-explanatory notation, the members of household J optimally choose purchases of
the consumption good Cj,t and holdings of money Mj,t by maximising their lifetime utility
function, which is assumed to be symmetric to that of the members of household I, subject
to the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τC
t +Γ v(vj,t))PC,t Cj,t + Mj,t (15)
=( 1 − τN
t − τ
W h
t ) Wj,t Nj,t + TRj,t − Tj,t + Mj,t−1 +Φ j,t
with the transaction cost Γv(vj,t) depending on consumption-based velocity; that is, the
inverse of the household members’ money-to-consumption ratio.
Deﬁning Λj,t/PC,t as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (15),
the ﬁrst-order conditions for maximising the household members’ lifetime utility with re-
spect to Cj,t and Mj,t are given by:
Λj,t =
(Cj,t − κC J,t−1)−σ
1+τC
t +Γ v(vj,t)+Γ  
v(vj,t)vj,t
, (16)
17The markup depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated labour
services supplied by the members of household I, which in turn determines the ﬁrms’ price elasticity of
demand for these services.
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=1 − Γ 
v(vj,t)v2
j,t, (17)
where Λj,t represents the shadow price of a unit of the consumption good for household
member j.
The members of household J act as wage-setters for their diﬀerentiated labour services
in a manner analogous to the behaviour of the members of household I. Hence, we obtain a
ﬁrst-order condition for their optimal wage-setting decision similar to that for the members
of household I.
3.2 Firms
There are two types of ﬁrms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed
by f ∈ [0,1], each of which produces a single tradable diﬀerentiated intermediate good,
Yf,t, and a set of three representative ﬁrms, which combine the purchases of domestically-
produced intermediate goods with purchases of imported intermediate goods into three
distinct non-tradable ﬁnal goods, namely a private consumption good, QC
t , a private in-
vestment good, QI
t, and a public consumption good, QG
t .
3.2.1 Intermediate-Good Firms
Each intermediate-good ﬁrm f produces its diﬀerentiated output using an increasing-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology,




f,t − ψ, 0
 
, (18)
utilising as inputs homogenous capital services, Kf,t, that are rented from the members of
household I in fully competitive markets, and an index of diﬀerentiated labour services,
Nf,t, which combines household-speciﬁc varieties of labour supplied in monopolistically
competitive markets. The variable zt represents (total-factor) productivity which is assumed
to be identical across ﬁrms and which evolves over time according to an exogenous serially
correlated process,
ln(zt)=( 1 − ρz)z + ρz ln(zt−1)+εz,t, (19)
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ﬁxed cost of production.18
Capital and Labour Inputs
Taking the rental cost of capital RK,t and the aggregate wage index Wt (to be derived
below) as given, the ﬁrm’s optimal demand for capital and labour services must solve
the problem of minimising total input cost RK,t Kf,t +( 1+τ
W f
t )Wt Nf,t subject to the
technology constraint (18). Here, τ
W f
t denotes the payroll tax rate levied on wage payments
(representing the ﬁrm’s contribution to social security).
Deﬁning as MCf,t the Lagrange multiplier associated with the technology constraint
(18), the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s cost minimisation problem with respect to








MCf,t =( 1 + τ
W f
t )Wt, (21)
with the payroll tax rate τ
W f
t introducing a wedge between the ﬁrm’s eﬀective labour cost
and the marginal revenue of labour.
The Lagrange multiplier MCf,t measures the shadow price of varying the use of capital
and labour services; that is, nominal marginal cost. We note that, since all ﬁrms f face
the same input prices and since they all have access to the same production technology,
nominal marginal cost MCf,t are identical across ﬁrms; that is, MCf,t = MCt with
MCt =
1
zt αα(1 − α)1−α (RK,t)α((1 + τ
W f
t )Wt)1−α. (22)
The labour input used by ﬁrm f in producing its diﬀerentiated output, Nf,t, is assumed
to be a composite of two household-speciﬁc bundles of labour services, NI
f,t and NJ
f,t which
combine the diﬀerentiated labour services of the individual members of the two households





















18The ﬁxed cost of production will be chosen to ensure zero proﬁts in steady state. This in turn guarantees
that there is no incentive for other ﬁrms to enter the market in the long run.
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f,t the use of the diﬀerentiated labour services supplied by house-




































where ηI,η J > 1 are the intratemporal elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerentiated
labour services of the members of household I and household J, respectively.
With nominal wage contracts for diﬀerentiated labour services i and j being set in mo-
nopolistically competitive markets, ﬁrm f takes wages Wi,t and Wj,t as given and chooses








f,tdj, subject to the ag-
gregation constraints (24) and (25). This yields the following demand functions for labour













































Next, taking the wage indexes WI,t and WJ,t as given, the ﬁrm chooses the combination
of the household-speciﬁc labour bundles NI
f,t and NJ
f,t that minimise WI,tNI
f,t + WJ,t NJ
f,t
subject to aggregation constraint (23). This yields the following demand functions for the
19In principle, the two household-speciﬁc bundles of labour services could be distinguished by diﬀerences
in skill levels across households, resulting in a larger dispersion of wage income which may ultimately provide
a rationale for the existence of liquidity constraints on the part of the low-income household.
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NI





















is the aggregate nominal wage index, which has the property that the minimum cost of using
the composite labour index Nf,t as an input in producing the diﬀerentiated intermediate
output Yf,t is given by Wt Nf,t.
Aggregating across the continuum of intermediate-good ﬁrms f, we obtain the following
































Each ﬁrm f sells its diﬀerentiated output Yf,t in both domestic and foreign markets under
monopolistic competition. We assume, as in Betts and Devereux (1996), that the ﬁrm
charges diﬀerent prices at home and abroad, pricing in local currency. In both markets, there
is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price contracts ` a la Calvo (1983). Accordingly,
ﬁrm f receives permission to optimally reset prices in a given period t either with probability
1 − ξH or with probability 1 − ξX, depending on whether the ﬁrm sells its diﬀerentiated
output in the domestic or the foreign market.
Deﬁning as PH,f,t the domestic price of good f and as PX,f,t its foreign price denominated
in foreign currency, all ﬁrms that receive permission to reset their price contracts in a given
period t choose the same price ˜ PH,t = ˜ PH,f,t and ˜ PX,t = ˜ PX,f,t, depending on the market of
destination. Those ﬁrms which do not receive permission are allowed to adjust their prices




















that is, the price contracts are indexed to a geometric average of past changes in the
aggregate price indexes, PH,t and PX,t, and the steady-state inﬂation rates, πH and πX,
where χH and χX are indexation parameters.
Each ﬁrm f receiving permission to optimally reset its domestic and/or foreign price in
period t maximises the discounted sum of its expected nominal proﬁts,
Et









subject to the price-indexation schemes (35) and (36) and taking as given domestic and












is the ﬁrm’s discount rate deﬁned as the average stochastic discount factor of the members
of household I owning the ﬁrm,20 and
DH,f,t = PH,f,t Hf,t − MCt Hf,t, (39)
DX,f,t = St PX,f,tXf,t − MCt Xf,t (40)
are period-t nominal proﬁts (net of ﬁxed cost) yielded in the domestic and foreign markets,
respectively, which are distributed as dividends to the members of household I.21
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition characterising the ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing decision for its output sold in the domestic market:
Et





















This expression states that in those intermediate-good markets in which price contracts
are re-optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the ﬁrms’ discounted sum of expected
20In equilibrium, the stochastic discount factor is equal across all members of household I;t h a ti s ,
Λi,t,t+k =Λ I,t,t+k.
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April 2007revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal cost. In the absence of price staggering
(ξH = 0), the factor θ/(θ − 1) represents the markup of the price charged in domestic
markets over nominal marginal cost, reﬂecting the degree of monopoly power on the part
of the intermediate-good ﬁrms.22
Similarly, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition characterising the ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing decision for its output sold in the foreign market:
Et






















The representative ﬁrm producing the non-tradable ﬁnal private consumption good, QC
t ,
combines purchases of a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HC
t ,w i t h
purchases of a bundle of imported foreign intermediate goods, IM C


























where the parameter µC > 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
the distinct bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, while νC measures the
home bias in the production of the consumption good.
Notice that the consumption-good ﬁrm incurs a cost, ΓIM C(IM C
t /QC
t ) (deﬁned in Ap-
pendix A.1), when varying the use of the bundle of imported intermediate goods in produc-
ing the consumption good. As a result, the import share is relatively unresponsive in the
short run to changes in the relative price of imported goods, while the level of imports is
permitted to jump in response to changes in overall demand.23
Deﬁning as HC
f,t and IM C
f∗,t the use of the intermediate goods produced by the domestic
22The markup depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated goods
supplied by the intermediate-good ﬁrms to the domestic ﬁnal-good ﬁrms, which in turn determines the
ﬁnal-good ﬁrms’ price elasticity of demand for the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods.
23While our treatment of the adjustment cost as being external to the ﬁrm would formally involve assuming
the existence of a large number of ﬁrms with appropriate changes in notation (see, e.g., Bayoumi, Laxton
and Pesenti, 2004), we abstract from these changes for ease of exposition.
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HC
t =























where θ, θ∗ > 1 are the intratemporal elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods produced domestically and abroad.
With nominal prices for diﬀerentiated intermediate goods f and f∗ being set in mono-
polistically competitive markets, the consumption-good ﬁrm takes prices PH,f,t and PIM,f ∗,t
as given and chooses the optimal use of each diﬀerentiated intermediate good f and f∗ by





0 PIM,f ∗,t IM C
f∗,t df ∗, subject to the aggregation constraints (44) and
(45). This yields the following demand functions for the domestic and foreign intermediate



































are the aggregate price indexes for the bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate goods,
respectively.
Next, taking the price indexes PH,t and PIM,t as given, the consumption-good ﬁrm
chooses the combination of the domestic and foreign intermediate-good bundles HC
t and
IM C
t that minimises PH,tHC
t + PIM,t IM C
t subject to aggregation constraint (43). This
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is the price of a unit of the private consumption good and Γ
†








The representative ﬁrm producing the non-tradable ﬁnal private investment good, QI
t,
is modelled in an analogous manner. Speciﬁcally, the investment-good ﬁrm combines its
purchase of a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HI
t , with the purchase
of a bundle of imported foreign intermediate goods, IM I


























where the parameter µI > 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the
distinct bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, while νI measures the home
bias in the production of the investment good.
All other variables related to the production of the investment good—import adjust-
ment cost, ΓIM I,t(IM I
t /QI
t); the optimal demand for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and bundled domestic and
foreign intermediate goods, HI
f,t, HI
t and IM I
f∗,t, IM I
t , respectively; as well as the price of
a unit of the investment good, PI,t—are deﬁned or derived in a manner analogous to that
for the consumption good.24
In contrast, the non-tradable ﬁnal public consumption good QG
t is assumed to be a
























24Notice that even in the absence of import adjustment cost, the prices of the consumption and investment
goods may diﬀer due to diﬀerences in the import content.
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Aggregating across the three ﬁnal-good ﬁrms, we obtain the following demand for do-










IMf∗,t = IM C







where Ht = HC
t + HI
t + HG
t and IMt = IM C
t + IM I
t .
The purchase of the imported intermediate good f∗ corresponds to the diﬀerentiated
output sold in the home market by the foreign intermediate-good producer f∗; that is,
sI M f∗,t =( 1− s)X∗
f∗,t, taking into account diﬀerences in country size. Similarly, with
intermediate-good ﬁrms setting prices in terms of local currency, the price of the interme-
diate good imported from abroad (the import price index of the home country) is equal to
the price charged by the foreign producer in the home country (the export price index of
the foreign country); that is, PIM,f ∗,t = P∗
X,f∗,t (PIM,t = P∗
X,t).
3.3 Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
The ﬁscal authority purchases the ﬁnal public consumption good, Gt, makes transfer pay-
ments, TRt, issues bonds to reﬁnance its debt, Bt, earns seignorage on outstanding money
holdings, Mt−1, and raises taxes with details on the latter given above. The ﬁscal authority’s
period-by-period budget constraint then has the following form:
PG,t Gt + TRt + Bt + Mt−1 (58)
= τC




   1−ω
0









t (RK,t ut − (Γu(ut)+δ)PI,t)Kt + τD
t Dt + Tt + R−1
t Bt+1 + Mt,
where all quantities are expressed in per-capita-terms (deﬁned below), except for the labour
services and wages, which are diﬀerentiated across the members of the two households.
The ﬁscal authority’s purchases of the ﬁnal public consumption good are speciﬁed as
a fraction of steady-state nominal output, gt = PG,t Gt/PY Y , and are assumed to follow a
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gt =( 1 − ρg)g + ρg gt−1 + εg,t. (59)
Similarly, transfers as a fraction of steady-state nominal output, trt = TRt/PY Y ,a r e
assumed to evolve according to
trt =( 1 − ρtr)tr + ρtr trt−1 + εtr,t. (60)
Lump-sum taxes as a fraction of steady-state nominal output, τt = Tt/PY Y , are adjusted








where BY is the ﬁscal authority’s target for the ratio of government debt to output, while all
distortionary tax rates τX
t with X = C, D, K, N, Wh and Wf are assumed to be exogenously
set by the ﬁscal authority and constant, τX
t = τX, unless otherwise stated.
The monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor-type interest-rate rule (cf. Taylor,
1993) speciﬁed in terms of annual consumer-price inﬂation and quarterly output growth,
R4
t = φR R4















where R4 = β−4 Π is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, Π denotes the monetary author-
ity’s inﬂation target and gY is the (gross) rate of output growth in steady state (assumed
to equal one). The term εR,t represents a serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock.
3.4 Aggregation and Aggregate Resource Constraint
The model is closed by imposing market-clearing conditions, formulating the aggregate re-
source constraint and stating the law of motion for the domestic holdings of international
assets. Beforehand, it is convenient to deﬁne household and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables in aggre-
gate per-capita terms and to derive aggregate wage and price dynamics.
3.4.1 Aggregation
Per-Capita Quantities
Except for labour services Nh,t, which are diﬀerentiated across households members, the
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Xh,t is given by Xt =
  1
0 Xh,t dh =( 1− ω)Xi,t + ωX j,t, as all members of each household
choose identical allocations in equilibrium. Hence, aggregate consumption is given by
Ct =( 1 − ω)Ci,t + ωC j,t. (63)
Similarly, aggregate money holdings are given by
Mt =( 1 − ω)Mi,t + ωM j,t. (64)
while aggregate transfers and lump-sum taxes are given by
TRt =( 1 − ω)TRi,t + ωT R j,t, (65)
Tt =( 1 − ω)Ti,t + ωT j,t. (66)
Since only members of household I hold ﬁnancial assets, we obtain the following condi-
tions for aggregate holdings of domestic government and internationally traded bonds:
Bt+1 =( 1 − ω)Bi,t+1, (67)
BF
t+1 =( 1 − ω)BF
i,t+1. (68)
Similarly, only members of household I accumulate physical capital,
It =( 1 − ω)Ii,t, (69)
Kt+1 =( 1 − ω)Ki,t+1, (70)
and only members of household I receive dividends from domestic intermediate-good pro-
ducing ﬁrms,
Dt =( 1 − ω)Di,t. (71)
Aggregate Wage Dynamics
With the members of household I setting their wage contracts Wi,t according to equation
(12) and equation (13), respectively, the wage index WI,t evolves according to
WI,t =
⎛
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household J; that is, WJ,t.
Aggregate Price Dynamics
With intermediate-good ﬁrms f setting their price contracts for the diﬀerentiated products
sold domestically, PH,f,t, according to equation (35) and equation (41), respectively, the
aggregate price index PH,t evolves according to
PH,t =
⎛













A similar relationship holds for the aggregate index of price contracts set for the diﬀer-
entiated products sold abroad, PX,t.
3.4.2 Aggregate Resource Constraint and Net Foreign Assets
Imposing market-clearing conditions (see Appendix A.2 for details) implies the following
aggregate resource constraint:

































measures the aggregate transaction costs incurred by the members of the two types of
households.
The domestic holdings of internationally traded bonds (that is, the home country’s (net)









TBt = St PX,tXt − PIM,t IMt (77)
25Notice that the existence of a ﬁnancial intermediation premium guarantees that, in the non-stochastic
steady state, holdings of internationally traded bonds are zero worldwide.
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denotes the domestic terms of trade; that is, the domestic price of imports relative to the
price of exports in domestic currency.
4 Calibration and Illustrative Simulations
In this section, we provide details on the baseline calibration of the NAWM and present a
small number of simulations to illustrate its dynamic properties.
4.1 Calibration
In calibrating the NAWM, we follow the literature and ﬁrst set key steady-state ratios,
including the ratios of the various nominal expenditure categories over nominal output,
equal to their empirical counterparts.26 For example, the ratios of private consumption to
output in the euro area and the United States are set to 0.60 and 0.62, respectively. In this
context, given the NAWM’s two-country setup, it is suﬃcient to calibrate the respective
import-to-output ratios and the shares of imports in private consumption and investment
to obtain a consistent speciﬁcation of the steady-state trade linkages. Of course, since we
decided to use data on total imports, our calibration overstates the existing trade linkages
between the euro area and the United States. However, since we focus on the euro area
in the subsequent analysis, this strategy should provide a more realistic assessment of the
international repercussions of unilateral tax reforms in the euro area than using data on
the actual trade ﬂows between the euro area and the United States alone. As regards the
calibration of the money-to-consumption ratios, we imputed the fractions of the monetary
aggregate M1 held by the household sector over nominal consumption expenditure, which
amount to, respectively, 1.34 and 0.42 per quarter.27 Finally, the steady-state ratios of
government debt over output are uniformly set equal to 2.40 per quarter (in line with
26The calibrated steady-state ratios are summarised in Appendix Table B.1.
27In calibrating the money-to-consumption ratios, we used data on currency in circulation and overnight
deposits held by households for the euro area over the period 1999-2004, while we adopted the calibration
by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006) for the United States.
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dividend income-to-output ratios are assumed to be zero in steady state.
While the calibration of the steady-state ratios is based on observed data, we have
chosen the remaining structural parameters of the NAWM with the objective of closely
matching the pattern of the dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock as implied by
the estimated closed-economy model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2003).28 Thus,
broadly similar values are assigned to those parameters that are common to both models.29
Speciﬁcally, the inverse of the labour supply elasticity is set equal to a value of 2, in line
with the estimate obtained by Smets and Wouters (2003). We will examine the sensitivity
of our results to variations in this key parameter later on. Notable exceptions from our
calibration strategy relate to the calibration of the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, which is raised to a value of 2, compared with a value of about 1.35 estimated
by Smets and Wouters (2003), and the elasticity of the investment adjustment cost which
is set equal to 3, compared with 6.77. These modiﬁcations help to partly oﬀset the eﬀects
induced by the ability of household I to borrow from abroad.
In calibrating the behaviour of the two types of households, we set the size of household J
to 0.25, in line with the estimates reported in Coenen and Straub (2005). The parameters
governing the wage-setting decisions of the two households are chosen symmetrically with
both the degree of wage stickiness and the degree of wage indexation ﬁxed at a value of 0.75,
in line with the empirical ﬁndings reported in Smets and Wouters (2003). Similarly, the
markup power of the two households is assumed to be symmetric and equal to 20 percent,
consistent with a uniform price elasticity of 6 for the demand of the intermediate-good
ﬁrms for the households’ diﬀerentiated labour services. Notwithstanding, the proﬁle of
wages and hours worked can diﬀer across the two types of households because of diﬀerences
in the households’ marginal rate of substitution.
As regards the pricing behaviour of intermediate-good ﬁrms selling their diﬀerentiated
outputs in domestic markets, we follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and set the degrees of
stickiness and indexation equal to 0.90 and 0.50, respectively. In contrast, the degree of
28The calibrated values for all structural parameters are summarised in Appendix Table B.2.
29In our baseline calibration, we further assume that the structural parameters in the euro area and the
United States are fully symmetric.
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to equal 0.30. This guarantees that the terms of trade (deﬁned as the domestic import
price relative to the export price in domestic currency) are positively correlated with the
real exchange rate, as observed in the data (cf. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000).30 The price
elasticity of demand for the diﬀerentiated outputs is assumed to equal 6, implying a 20
percent steady-state markup over marginal cost in domestic and foreign markets. Similarly,
the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the household-speciﬁc bundles of labour
services are set equal to the demand elasticity of 6 assumed for the diﬀerentiated labour
services. Finally, the ﬁxed cost in production is chosen to ensure zero proﬁts in steady state,
and the steady-state productivity level is normalised to unity.
The remaining open-economy parameters are calibrated largely in line with the macroe-
conomic literature. Speciﬁcally, the substitution elasticities between home and foreign goods
in forming the consumption and investment bundles are set equal to 1.50. Ultimately, this
implies a relative low sensitivity of domestic private absorption to changes in the terms
of trade. Similarly, we set the parameter governing the adjustment cost associated with
changing the import share in consumption equal to 2.50, thereby further dampening the
sensitivity of consumption to the terms of trade in the short run. In contrast, adjusting
the import share in investment is assumed to be costless. This choice of adjustment cost
parameters, together with the calibration of the investment adjustment cost and the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, proves important for closely matching the dynamic
responses of consumption and investment to a monetary policy shock implied by the Smets-
Wouters (2003) model, as the import adjustment cost parameters determine the ability of
household I to borrow from abroad in the short to medium run, which in turn inﬂuences
the proﬁle of its intertemporal consumption and investments decisions.
In calibrating the tax rates on consumption purchases and labour income and the con-
tribution rates to social security, we use the data on the tax wedges reported in Table 1
above. In contrast, the tax rate on capital income is calibrated such that it supports the
30A recent study by Gopinath and Rigobon (2005) suggests that the degree of price stickiness in both
exports and imports is closer to 0.75, implying an average duration of price contracts of about four quarters.
Such a calibration, however, would yield a counterfactual negative correlation between the real exchange
rate and the terms of trade, with unintentional consequences for model-based simulations.
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set to zero for simplicity. In order to establish a more meaningful role of transfer payments
made by the ﬁscal authority, we assume that transfers, in per-capita terms, are unevenly
distributed across the two types of households, favouring the members of households J over
those of household I in the proportion of 3 to 1. This guarantees that the level of con-
sumption (hours worked) for a member of household J is not more than 25 (15) percent
lower (higher) than that for a member of household I.31 In contrast, lump-sum taxes, yet
again in per-capita terms, are assumed to be distributed in the proportion of 3 to 1 to the
detriment of household I. Both the government spending-to-output ratio and the transfer-
to-output ratio are assumed to follow serially correlated processes with an autoregressive
coeﬃcient of 0.90. In this context, we choose the steady-state transfer-to-output ratio such
that the government budget constraint is satisﬁed in the long run. Finally, in calibrating
the ﬁscal policy rule, we set the sensitivity of aggregate lump-sum taxes with respect to the
government debt-to-output ratio to 0.10.
Last but not least, for the monetary policy rule, we set the interest-rate response coeﬃ-
cients on annual inﬂation (in deviation from an inﬂation target of 2 percent) and quarterly
output growth equal to 2.00 and 0.10, respectively, while the coeﬃcient on the lagged in-
terest rate is assumed to equal 0.95.32
4.2 Illustrative Simulations
Given the above calibration, we proceed to illustrate the dynamic properties of the NAWM.
In this context, we focus on the dynamic eﬀects of a monetary policy shock and two types of
transitory, but persistent ﬁscal shocks: a government spending shock and a transfer shock.
The latter two shocks have been chosen to highlight the importance of the two types of
households for the model’s aggregate outcomes.
31As a result, consumption of household J accounts for about 21 percent of aggregate private consumption.
At the same time, the wage sum of household J represents 48 percent of aggregate wage income. We leave
it for future research to confront these implications of our calibration with disaggregate data on the income
distribution of households in the euro area.
32The estimated interest-rate rule in Smets and Wouters (2003) prescribes a feedback of the nominal
interest rate to the quarterly inﬂation rate and the output gap, as well as the ﬁrst diﬀerence in these two
target variables, with the output gap being deﬁned in terms of the natural output level; that is, the output
level that would prevail in a version of the model without nominal rigidities.
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NAWM: Real exchange rate
NAWM: Terms of trade
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM and the Smets-Wouters (SW, 2003) model, this ﬁgure depicts
the dynamic responses of selected domestic variables to a monetary policy tightening equal to an 100 basis-
point increase in the annualised nominal interest rate. All dynamic responses are reported as percentage
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Figure 2 depicts the dynamic responses of selected domestic variables to a temporary
tightening of monetary policy equal to an one percentage-point increase in the annualised
short-term nominal interest rate for both the NAWM and the estimated closed-economy
model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2003). All dynamic responses are reported
as percentage deviations from steady state, except for the dynamic response of the real
interest rate which is reported as percentage-point deviation.
As can be seen in the upper and middle-left panels of Figure 2, the response patterns
of domestic output and private absorption (that is, aggregate private consumption and
investment) are broadly similar to those obtained in the Smets-Wouters (SW, 2003) model.
In particular, the peak eﬀects are of virtually identical size, although the adjustment to
steady state is somewhat faster in the NAWM. This, at least in part, reﬂects the fact that
the members of household I can borrow from abroad in order to smooth consumption over
time, without a need to lastingly cut back investment. Such behaviour is conﬁrmed by
the more muted response of imports (shown in the middle-right panel), when compared
to the responses of consumption and investment. Given the limited degree of stickiness
in the intermediate-good ﬁrms’ pricing behaviour when selling abroad, the appreciation of
the domestic currency is paralleled by a fall in the terms of trade (deﬁned as the domestic
import price relative to the export price in domestic currency), as documented in the lower-
right panel. Such an improvement in the terms of trade shifts domestic demand towards
imported goods by means of an expenditure-switching eﬀect and helps, due to its wealth
eﬀect, to at least partially oﬀset the contractionary eﬀect of the monetary tightening on
domestic consumption and investment. Finally, as shown in the lower-left panel, the real
short-term interest rate evolves in a broadly similar fashion in both models.33
Government Spending Shock
Figure 3 depicts selected dynamic responses to a persistent government spending shock
33As shown in Appendix Figure C.1, the terms-of-trade eﬀect in response to a productivity shock is even
stronger. Following a temporary increase in euro area productivity results in a considerable worsening of the
terms of trade, switching domestic and foreign demand towards domestic goods. As a result, the responses
of consumption and, to a lesser extent, investment are more smoothed out than in the closed-economy model
of Smets and Wouters (2003).
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equal to a one-percent increase in steady-state output.Figure 3: Dynamic Responses to a Government Spending Shock







































































Real rental rate of capital
Real marginal cost
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected domestic
variables to a persistent government spending shock (ρg =0 .90) equal to an one-percent increase in steady-
state output. All dynamic responses are reported as percentage deviations from steady, except for the
dynamic responses of inﬂation and the interest rate which are reported as percentage-point deviations.
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regards the ability of New-Keynesian DSGE models that have been augmented by an em-
pirically realistic fraction of liquidity-constrained households to crowd in aggregate private
consumption (see, e.g., Gal´ ı, L´ opez Salido and Vall´ es, 2004, and Coenen and Straub, 2005),
the upper-left panel of Figure 3 reveals that a government spending shock has a small, albeit
nearly negligible crowding-out eﬀect in the NAWM.34 Thus, the NAWM with our preferred
calibration does not generate the magnitude and persistence of the crowding-in eﬀect on
consumption that some empirical studies claim to exist. Interestingly, whereas Coenen and
Straub (2005) do ﬁnd a much more pronounced crowding-out eﬀect using a variant of the
Smets-Wouters (2003) model with a fraction of liquidity-constrained households equal in
size to household J, it is the NAWM’s open-economy setting which prevents aggregate pri-
vate consumption from falling more strongly, because it enables the members of household I
to borrow from abroad and thereby to smooth consumption more eﬀectively.
Indeed, as shown in the upper-right panel, imports rise strongly following the government
spending shock. This rise in imports is accompanied by a strong fall in the terms of trade, as
shown in the middle-right panel. Yet again, the improvement in the terms of trade induces
protracted expenditure switching away from domestic towards foreign goods. Thereby, the
negative wealth eﬀect generated by the government spending shock is largely oﬀset by the
positive wealth eﬀect due to the improvement in the terms of trade. The increase in output
following the government spending shock induces an increase in both the aggregate wage
rate and the rental rate of capital, and the ensuing increase in marginal cost leads to a
rise in inﬂation. Accordingly, triggered by the spike in output growth and the build up of
inﬂationary pressures, the monetary policy stance is tightened.
Transfer Shock
Figure 4 portrays the dynamic responses to a persistent transfer shock equal to a one-
percent increase in steady-state output. Obviously, in a model with a single type of house-
34Clearly, as shown in Appendix Figure C.2, increasing the size of household J to one-half would result
in a crowding-in eﬀect, even though it is of small magnitude and rather short-lived. In contrast, assuming
a size of zero for household J would lead to a protracted, but still limited, fall in consumption.
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Real rental rate of capital
Real marginal cost
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected domestic
variables to a persistent transfer shock (ρtr =0 .90) equal to an one-percent increase in steady-state output.
All dynamic responses are reported as percentage deviations from steady state, except for the dynamic
responses of inﬂation and the interest rate which are reported as percentage-point deviations.
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have no real eﬀects since Ricardian equivalence holds. In our setting, however, real eﬀects
do arise because the members of household J are characterised by a higher propensity to
consume out of disposable income due to their limited ability to participate in ﬁnancial
markets and, thus, to smooth consumption. These eﬀects are exacerbated by the fact that,
owing to our calibration, a transfer shock implies an income transfer from the members of
household I to those of household J.
As can be seen in the upper-left panel of Figure 4, the transfer shock induces an increase
in aggregate private consumption which is only partially oﬀset by a decline in investment.
Thus, given the overall increase in private absorption, the demand for foreign goods rises
strongly. The initial demand eﬀect, which is brought about by an expansion in current dis-
posable income due to an increase in both wages and hours worked, is further strengthened
by an improvement in the terms of trade switching demand away from domestic towards
foreign goods. Incidentally, with short-term real interest rates initially falling by a small
amount, the monetary policy response proves to be mildly accommodative.
Further Analysis
In an attempt to cast further light on the inﬂuences of the two types of households on the
propagation of ﬁscal policy shocks, Figure 5 compares the dynamic responses of selected
household-speciﬁc variables. In particular, the panels in the left column show the household-
speciﬁc responses of consumption, the real wage and hours worked following a persistent
government spending shock, while the panels on the right show the respective responses to
a persistent transfer shock.
As can be observed in the upper-left panel of Figure 5, because of the negative wealth
eﬀect, consumption spending by the members of household I falls, even though moderately,
in response to a government spending shock. In contrast, consumption spending on the part
of the members of household J is crowded in by more than 0.1 percent. This crowding-in
is triggered by an increase in the household members’ disposable income, the latter being
driven by an upsurge in hours worked and, to a lesser extent, by a gradual rise in the real
wage. Nevertheless, given the rather small size of household J, the aggregate eﬀect on
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consumption is negligible, as documented in Figure 3 above.Figure 5: Household-Speciﬁc Responses to Fiscal Policy Shocks
Government spending shock Transfer shock
























































Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected domestic
variables to a government spending shock and a lump-sum transfer shock, equal to a 1 percent increase in
steady-state output. All dynamic responses are reported as percentage deviations from steady state.
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negligible decline in consumption on the part of the members of household I. This decline
reﬂects a loss in income because of the disproportionate ﬁnancing requirement that this
household faces. The ensuing negative wealth eﬀect is only partially oﬀset by an increase
in wage income owing to a rise in both hours worked and the real wage. In contrast, the
income transfer boosts consumption spending of the members of household J by around
two percent, despite the fact that the responses of hours worked and the real wage tend to
oﬀset each other.
5 Tax Reform and Economic Performance
Having illustrated the dynamic properties of the NAWM by focusing on a monetary policy
shock and two types of ﬁscal shocks, we ﬁnally proceed to examine the potential beneﬁts
and spillovers of reducing the tax distortions that have been suggested as one of the primary
explanations for the euro area’s relatively poor labour-market performance. In particular,
we utilise the NAWM to evaluate the long-run eﬀects of reducing the level of the tax wedges
that have been documented for the euro area in Section 2 to those prevailing in the United
States. We also consider the transitional dynamics implied by such reductions and highlight
the possibility of distributional eﬀects.
5.1 Long-Run Eﬀects
Table 2 indicates the long-run eﬀects on selected domestic and foreign variables of lowering
euro area tax wedges to levels prevailing in the United States. All eﬀects are reported
as percentage changes relative to the initial steady state.35 We consider four alternative
scenarios: a reduction in the consumption tax, a reduction in the sum of the tax on labour
income and households’ social security contributions (reﬂecting the fact that these two
wedges enter the households’ decision problem in an isomorphic manner), a reduction in
35We conﬁne ourselves to a positive analysis, while recognising that an increase in hours worked following a
reduction in tax wedges lowers utility. A normative analysis would need to take into account the transitional
dynamics and possible distributional eﬀects. This could be an interesting extension of the analysis which
we leave for future research.
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Overall
Components of overall tax wedge
tax wedge
∆τC = -10.6 ∆(τN + τW h) = -1.5 ∆τW f = -14.8 ∆¯ τ = -26.8
Euro area
Output 4.22 0.74 5.38 11.89
Consumption 4.01 0.71 5.12 11.30
Investment 2.77 0.49 3.54 7.74
Exports 3.54 0.63 4.52 9.92
Imports 1.12 0.20 1.42 3.07
Hours worked 4.84 0.85 6.19 13.72
Real wage -0.79 -0.14 12.68 11.40
After-tax real wage 8.97 1.83 12.68 24.78
Eﬀective labour cost -0.60 -0.11 -0.76 -1.60
Terms of trade 2.40 0.42 3.05 6.65
United States
Output 0.19 0.03 0.24 0.51
Consumption 0.42 0.07 0.53 1.15
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this table indicates the steady-state eﬀects on selected
domestic and foreign variables of permanent percentage-point reductions in the euro area tax wedges to
levels prevailing in the United States. All eﬀects are reported as percentage changes relative to the initial
steady state.
the ﬁrms’ social security contributions and, ﬁnally, the reduction of the overall tax wedge
deﬁned as the combination of the three individual scenarios. In implementing each of these
scenarios, it is assumed that the implied loss in revenue is ﬁnanced by a decrease in the
ﬁscal authority’s transfer payments to households such that the government spending and
debt-to-output ratios remain unchanged in the long run.36
Starting with the reduction in the overall tax wedge, the results presented in the ﬁnal
36We also considered an alternative ﬁnancing scheme according to which the revenue loss due to the
lowering of tax rates is ﬁnanced by a reduction in government spending. The wealth eﬀect of the latter
tends to oﬀset the eﬀect on hours worked, while the consumption eﬀect is strengthened. However, we do not
ﬁnd this alternative ﬁnancing scheme appealing, not least owing to the size of the spending restraint that
would be required to maintain the initial government debt-to-output ratio. The results for the alternative
ﬁnancing scheme and also for one-percentage point reductions in individual tax rates are available on request.
With regard to the latter, it should be noted that they cannot be interpreted as standard multipliers given
the non-linearity of the model.
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eﬀects on labour-market outcomes and overall economic performance. As regards labour-
market outcomes, hours worked increase by around 14 percent in the long run, while the
(pre-tax) consumption real wage of households rises by more than 11 percent. The rise
in hours worked induces an increase in the long-run capital stock, sustained by a higher
level of investment. As a result, aggregate output increases by about 12 percent, and the
ensuing rise in income boosts consumption by a similar amount.37 In order to balance the
supply of and the demand for domestic goods, the increase in aggregate output must lead
to a fall in the relative price of domestic goods; that is, to a deterioration of the domestic
terms of trade. The implied positive wealth eﬀect raises consumption in the United States
and thereby foreign demand for domestic goods, bringing about an increase in euro area
exports. In contrast, the deterioration of the terms of trade leads to a subdued response of
euro area imports.38 Lastly, due to the terms-of-trade eﬀect output in the United States
moves up less than consumption.
In order to better understand the mechanisms behind the long-run eﬀects on labour-
market outcomes, it is helpful to compare the eﬀects of reductions in the individual com-
ponents of the overall tax wedge. For instance, the reduction in the consumption tax
favourably aﬀects the intratemporal margin of households by raising the purchasing power of
their wage income. Thus, consumption becomes more attractive relative to leisure, thereby
enhancing the supply of labour in the economy. The rise in labour supply in turn leads
to a fall in the (pre-tax) real wage (deﬂated with the price of the consumption good) and,
similarly, to a reduction in ﬁrms’ eﬀective labour cost (deﬂated with the ﬁrms’ implicit out-
put price). As the reduction in the sum of the tax on labour income and households’ social
security contributions aﬀects the same margin, the qualitative responses of the model are
quite similar. Diﬀerences in the long-run eﬀects of the two scenarios can be explained by
37Note that consumption and investment increase in diﬀerent proportions because of a rise in the relative
price of the investment good. In contrast, the steady-state ratios of nominal consumption and investment
over nominal output remain unchanged.
38With the holdings of internationally traded bonds (that is, the net foreign asset position denominated
in foreign currency) being zero both in the original and in the new steady state, the improvement in the
domestic trade balance owing to the increase (decline) in export (import) volumes is oﬀset by the depreciation
of the domestic currency.
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Remarkably, the permanent reduction in ﬁrms’ social security contributions has a quite
diﬀerent long-run impact on labour-market outcomes, notably wages. The reduction in so-
cial security contributions aﬀects the intermediate-good ﬁrms’ intratemporal labour-capital
margin by reducing the eﬀective cost of labour utilisation. This decline in eﬀective labour
cost leads to a rise in labour demand, which in turn induces an increase in the real wage.
In equilibrium, the latter dampens the reduction in eﬀective labour cost, which explains its
subdued negative long-run response.
Table 3 summarises our sensitivity analysis regarding the long-run eﬀects of lowering
euro area tax wedges to levels prevailing in the United States. First, we analyse the extent
to which the strength of the long-run eﬀects depend on the labour-supply elasticity of
households, which is considered to be the key parameter in determining the labour-market
outcomes. To this end, the upper panel in Table 3 shows how the long-run eﬀects vary when
the baseline labour-supply elasticity of 0.5 is scaled up by a factor of six, corresponding to a
labour-supply elasticity of 3, as implied by the calibration in Prescott (2004). As expected,
in this case hours worked are much more sensitive to reductions in labour-market distortions.
For example, reducing all components of the overall tax wedge to the levels prevailing in the
United States leads to an increase in hours worked of about 21.5 percent, compared with an
13.7 percent increase for the baseline calibration in Table 2. Accordingly, a stronger long-run
eﬀect on domestic output materialises which, in turn, requires a larger deterioration of the
terms of trade to re-balance the demand for domestic versus foreign goods. Consequently,
the spillover eﬀects on foreign output are strengthened.
For a labour-supply elasticity of 3, a back-of-the-envelope calculation for a stylised
closed-economy model similar to that employed in Prescott (2004) results in a somewhat
smaller increase in hours worked of about 20 percent.40 In contrast, assuming, as in our
39Conventional public ﬁnance wisdom argues in favour of consumption taxes over income taxes and social
security contributions as a source of government revenue. Assessing the relative eﬀectiveness of reducing
individual tax wedges, however, is not straightforward in our framework, given the fact that in all cases the
reductions in tax revenue are oﬀset by changes in the ﬁscal authority’s transfers to households which, as
illustrated below, may have important distributional eﬀects. In this context, for example, Krusell, Quadrini
and R´ ıos-Rull (1996) show in a model with heterogeneous households and endogenously determined transfer
levels that income taxes are not necessarily worse in welfare terms.
40We are grateful to our discussant Jordi Gal´ ı for proposing this back-of-the-envelope calculation to us.
Details are available on request.
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the diﬀerent magnitudes of the respective tax reductions and also by the diﬀerential eﬀectsTable 3: Sensitivity of the Long-Run Eﬀects of Lowering Tax Wedges in the Euro Area
Overall
Components of overall tax wedge
tax wedge
∆τC = -10.6 ∆(τN + τW h) = -1.5 ∆τW f = -14.8 ∆¯ τ = -26.8
A. Labour supply elasticity scaled up by 6 (cf. Prescott, 2004)
Euro area
Output 6.58 1.18 8.51 18.52
Hours worked 7.59 1.35 9.83 21.52
Terms of trade 3.81 0.69 4.91 10.49
United States
Output 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.37
B. Full asset-market participation (ω =0 )
Euro Area
Output 2.13 0.45 2.99 5.66
Hours worked 2.44 0.51 3.44 6.50
Terms of trade 1.21 0.26 1.70 3.20
United States
Output 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.25
C. Substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods scaled up by 2
Euro Area
Output 4.43 0.78 5.66 12.52
Hours worked 4.74 0.83 6.05 13.41
Terms of trade 1.16 0.21 1.48 3.20
United States
Output 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.25
Note: For alternative calibrations of the NAWM, this table indicates the steady-state eﬀects on selected
domestic and foreign variables of permanent percentage-point reductions in the euro area tax wedges to
levels prevailing in the United States. All eﬀects are reported as percentage changes relative to the initial
steady state.
baseline calibration, an elasticity of 0.5 yields an increase in hours worked of roughly 9 per-
cent. Hence, these results suggest that the inclusion of households that are limited in their
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nomic outcomes via a stronger response of hours worked. Indeed, as depicted in the middle
panel of Table 3, simulating the model alternatively under the assumption that all house-
holds have full access to domestic and foreign asset markets results in noticeably smaller
long-run responses of hours worked. This is not surprising since for households with limited
participation in asset markets the variation of labour supply is an even more important
mechanism for adapting to changes in the economic environment than for households, who
can also adjust their income by varying the holdings of real and ﬁnancial assets.
Last but not least, we consider the implications of a higher substitution elasticity be-
tween home and foreign goods in producing the ﬁnal consumption and investment goods.
For the baseline analysis, we assumed a relatively low elasticity of 1.50, which resulted in a
rather pronounced change in the terms of trade, but limited spillovers onto output develop-
ments in the United States. As shown in the lower panel of Table 3, doubling this elasticity
leaves domestic output and labour-market outcomes largely unaﬀected, while it lowers the
need for adjustment in the terms of trade to re-balance demand internationally.41 As a
result, the spillover eﬀects onto foreign output turn out to be even weaker.42
Clearly, discrepancies in ﬁrms’ contributions to social security account for the largest
part of the diﬀerence in the overall tax wedge between the euro area and the United States.
Accordingly, in the policy debate, calls for reductions in labour-market distortions have
been largely centred around the need to lower ﬁrms’ social security contributions. In the
light of this debate, we will therefore focus the subsequent analysis on this component of
the overall tax wedge.
5.2 Transitional Dynamics
The transitional dynamics implied by the reduction in ﬁrms’ non-wage labour cost depends
on the timing of its implementation and also on the way the ﬁscal authority compensates
the implied losses in revenue. Here, we assume that the reduction is gradually phased in,
41Regarding the composition of aggregate demand (not shown in the table), however, somewhat larger
diﬀerences emerge, notably with respect to the size of trade ﬂows.
42We also explored the sensitivity of our results to variations in other structural parameters such as the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the degree of habit persistence in consumption, but varying those
parameters did not change the results in an economically important way.
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Real rental rate of capital
Real marginal cost
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this ﬁgure depicts the transitional dynamics of selected
domestic variables after a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in ﬁrms’ social security contributions
from 21.9 to 7.1 percent. All dynamic eﬀects are reported as percentage deviations from the initial steady
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lengthy decision-making processes before tax reforms pass into legislation in reality and also
in view of the delays in their actual implementation. Speciﬁcally, we assume that half of the
reduction takes place in the course of the ﬁrst year, that three quarters are implemented
by the end of the second year, and so forth. We maintain the assumption that the losses
in revenue are oﬀset by reductions in transfer payments. In this context, the reduction
in the steady-state transfers-to-output ratio is assumed to match the gradual reduction in
non-wage labour cost.
Figure 6 depicts the transitional dynamics of selected variables induced by the gradual
reduction in non-wage labour cost from 21.9 to 7.1 percent. On impact, both consumer
wages and hours worked start to increase, with the dynamics of wages being more drawn
out reﬂecting the existence of a rather high degree of inertia in the wage-setting process. The
implied increase in disposable income (which is reinforced by an increase in the rental rate of
capital due to the fact that capital services as an input in production have become relatively
scarce) boosts private consumption, while investment only gradually builds up. The ensuing
rise in the terms of trade shifts foreign demand towards domestic goods. This dampens the
demand-driven increase in imports and gives rise to a lasting expansion in exports. Because
of the reduction in non-wage labour cost, ﬁrms’ real marginal cost gradually falls, leading to
a decline in inﬂation. Given the strong pick up in output, however, the monetary authority
raises nominal interest rates, further dampening the upsurge in domestic demand.43
5.3 Distributional Eﬀects
Since the ﬁscal authority’s transfer payments are split amongst the two types of households
in a proportion of 3 to 1 in favour of household J, the reduction in transfers required to
maintain the initial government debt-to-output ratio aﬀects the members of household J
disproportionately. The potential distributional eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 7.
43As shown in Appendix Figure C.3, lowering non-wage labour cost instantaneously results in a front
loading of the adjustment process: real marginal cost falls on impact, triggering a pronounced decline in
inﬂation; and private absorption as well as exports overshoot their new steady-state values, the overshooting
being caused by a sharp initial rise in the terms of trade. Similarly, when simulating a gradual reduction in
non-wage labour cost without a feedback of interest rates to output growth, private absorption and exports
tend to overshoot because the demand eﬀects, owing to the implied increase in permanent income, dominate
the supply-side eﬀects initially, giving rise to inﬂationary pressures.
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Baseline scenario Compensation of household J
























































Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this ﬁgure depicts the distributional eﬀects on selected
household-speciﬁc variables of a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in ﬁrms’ social security contribu-
tions from 21.9 to 7.1 percent under alternative assumptions regarding burden sharing amongst households.
All dynamic eﬀects are reported as percentage deviations from steady state.
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back consumption by more than 8 percent in the long run because of the loss in transfer
income. In contrast, consumption spending on the part of the members of household I
can be raised by almost 9 percent since the positive supply-side eﬀects of the reduction in
non-wage labour cost and the ensuing rise in labour and capital income more than oﬀset the
reduction in transfer income. With the real wages of the two types of households moving
broadly in parallel, the members of household J increase their working hours signiﬁcantly
in order to equate the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution. In contrast, hours
worked on the part of the members of household I hardly move in the long run when
compared with the initial steady state.
Of course, modifying the assumption regarding the details of how the decline in revenue
is ﬁnanced may inﬂuence the distributional eﬀects of the reduction in non-wage labour cost
in important ways. For example, gradually increasing the proportion of transfers amongst
households to 5 to 1 in favour of household J when implementing the reduction in non-wage
labour cost shifts more of the burden of ﬁnancing the ﬁscal measure onto the members of
household I. As shown in the column on the right of Figure 7, such a redistribution policy
aimed at compensating the members of household J for the initial loss in income helps to
stabilise consumption on their part, while also dampening the observed discrepancies in
hours worked across households.
6 Conclusions
To examine the eﬀects of reducing labour-market distortions caused by euro area tax struc-
tures, we employed a calibrated version of the New Area-Wide Model currently under
development at the European Central Bank. Using this model, we conﬁrm the widely-held
view that reductions in tax distortions would have beneﬁcial eﬀects on labour-market out-
comes and overall economic performance. In fact, lowering euro area tax wedges to levels
prevailing in the United States would lead to a rise in hours worked and output by more
than 10 percent in the long run. At the same time, we show that tax reforms aimed at re-
ducing labour-market distortions have beneﬁcial spillovers to the euro area’s trade partners,
53
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 747
April 2007bolstering the case for tax reforms from a global perspective. Finally, we illustrate that, in
the presence of heterogeneous households, distributional eﬀects may be of importance when
gauging the impact of tax reforms.
A possible extension of our analysis would be to study the consequences of diﬀerences in
productivity growth across the euro area and the United States. Such diﬀerences are per-
ceived to be an important determinant of the employment and output (growth) diﬀerentials
observed over more recent years. Another interesting avenue for future research would be
to examine the consequences of diﬀerences in skill levels across the two types of households.
High tax wedges seem particularly problematic for low-skill, low-productivity workers since
it may be diﬃcult for workers that are protected by minimum-wage or industry pay norms
to fully accommodate any required wage correction.
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Krusell, P., V. Quadrini and J.-V. R´ ıos-Rull, 1996, “Are Consumption Taxes Really BetterAppendix A
In this appendix we provide the functional forms for the various adjustment and transaction
costs included in the NAWM and formulate the market-clearing conditions which need to
hold in equilibrium. We also restate the ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal wage and
price-setting decisions of households and ﬁrms in recursive form.
A.1 Functional Forms
Transaction Cost Technology
We assume that the transaction cost technology is identical across both types of households
and takes the form




where γv,1,γ v,2 > 0 (cf. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2006).
Capital Utilisation Cost
As in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), the capital utilisation cost function takes
the form
Γu(ui,t)=γu,1 (ui,t − 1) +
γu,2
2
(ui,t − 1)2, (A.2)
where γu,1,γ u,2 > 0.
Investment Adjustment Cost
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), we assume an investment adjustment










where γI > 0.
Import Adjustment Cost
Adjusting the use of imports in the production of the ﬁnal consumption good is subject to


















Working Paper Series No 747
April 2007where γIM C > 0 and assuming that the representative ﬁrm takes the previous period’s
(sector-wide) import share, IM C
t−1/QC
t−1,a sg i v e n .
A similar speciﬁcation holds for the use of imports in the production of the ﬁnal invest-
ment good.
International Transaction Cost
Members of household I encounter an intermediation or “risk” premium when they take
a position in the market for internationally traded bonds which depends on the per-capita













where γBF > 0. This speciﬁcation implies that, in the non-stochastic steady state, domestic
household members have no incentive to hold internationally traded bonds and the net
foreign asset position is zero worldwide.
A.2 Market Clearing
Market Clearing in the Labour Markets
Concentrating on household I, each member i acts as wage setter in a monopolistically
competitive market. Hence, in equilibrium the supply of its diﬀerentiated labour service
needs to equal intermediate-good ﬁrms’ demand,
Ni,t = Ni
t. (A.6)
































measures the degree of wage dispersion across the diﬀerentiated labour services i.
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of wage dispersion evolves according to



















where ˜ WI,t denotes the optimal wage contract chosen by those members of household I that
have received permission to reset their wages in period t,a n dπC,t = PC,t/PC,t−1.
As regards the total wage sum paid by ﬁrms to the members of household I,w eh a v e
  1−ω
0














where the ﬁrst equality has been obtained using the aggregate demand for labour services
of variety i; that is, NI
t (see equation (33)), while the last equality has been obtained using
the properties of the wage index WI,t (see equation (29)).
Similar considerations hold for the diﬀerentiated labour services supplied by the mem-
bers of household J.
Market Clearing in the Intermediate-Good Markets
Each intermediate-good producing ﬁrm f acts as price setter in domestic and foreign mo-
nopolistically competitive markets. Hence, in equilibrium the supply of its diﬀerentiated
good needs to equal domestic and foreign ﬁnal-good ﬁrms’ demand,
Yf,t = Hf,t + Xf,t. (A.11)
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April 2007measure the degree of dispersion across the diﬀerentiated goods f sold either domestically
or abroad.
Given the optimal price-setting strategies for intermediate-good ﬁrms, the two measures
of price dispersion evolve over time according to


































where ˜ PH,t and ˜ PX,t denote the optimal price contracts chosen by those ﬁrms that have
received permission to reset their prices in their home and foreign markets in period t,a n d
πH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1 and πX,t = PX,t/PX,t−1.
As regards the determination of the implicit price index of the continuum of diﬀerenti-

























= PH,tHt + St PX,tXt, (A.17)
where the second to last equality has been obtained using the aggregate demand rela-
tionships for the domestic intermediate goods sold in home and foreign markets, Hf,t and
sX f,t =( 1− s)IM ∗
f,t (see equations (56) and (57)), while the last equality has been ob-
tained using the properties of the price indexes PH,t and PX,t = P∗










Market Clearing in the Final-Good Markets
Market clearing in the fully competitive ﬁnal-good markets implies:
QC
t = Ct +Γ v,t, (A.19)
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t = It +Γ u(ut)Kt, (A.20)
QG
t = Gt. (A.21)
Market Clearing in the Capital Market and Distribution of Proﬁts














Market Clearing in the Domestic Government Bond Market
The equilibrium holdings of domestic government bonds evolve over time according to the
ﬁscal authority’s budget constraint (58), reﬂecting the ﬁscal authority’s need to issue debt
in order to ﬁnance its deﬁcit.
Market Clearing in the Market for Internationally Traded Bonds
In equilibrium, the holdings of internationally traded bonds satisfy the following market-
clearing condition:
sBF
t +( 1− s)B
F,∗
t =0 . (A.24)
Market Clearing in the Money Market
Because the monetary authority uses the nominal interest rate as its policy instrument, equi-
librium money holdings are determined by money demand, the latter being characterised
by the ﬁrst-order conditions (11) and (17).
A.3 Recursive First-Order Conditions
Optimal Wage Setting
The ﬁrst-order condition (13) characterising the optimal nominal wage contract ˜ WI,t chosen
by those members of household I that have received permission to reset their wage can be




































































A similar relationship holds for the ﬁrst-order condition characterising the optimal nom-
inal wage contract ˜ WJ,t chosen by members of household J.
Optimal Price Setting
The ﬁrst-order condition (41) characterising the optimal price contract chosen by those
intermediate good ﬁrms f that have received permission to reset their price in the domestic


















































Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition (42) characterising the optimal price contract set in
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This appendix summarises the details regarding the calibration of the steady-state ratios
and the structural parameters of the NAWM.
Table B.1: Steady-State Ratios
Value
Ratio Euro area United States Description
PCC/PY Y 0.60 0.62 Private consumption-to-output ratio
PII/PY Y 0.22 0.22 Private investment-to-output ratio
PGG/PY Y 0.18 0.16 Public consumption-to-output ratio
PIM IM/PY Y 0.18 0.13 Imports-to-output ratio
PIM IM C/PY Y 0.05 0.06 Private consumption good
PIM IM I/PY Y 0.13 0.07 Private investment good
M/(1 + τC)PCC 1.34 0.42 Money-to-consumption ratio
B/PY Y 2.40 2.40 Government debt-to-output ratio
D/PY Y 0.00 0.00 Dividend income-to-output ratio
Note: This table reports the steady-state ratios of the main expenditure categories over nominal output,
as obtained from the national accounts. The money-to-consumption ratios are computed as the ratio of
the narrow monetary aggregate M1 held by the household sector over nominal consumption expenditure.
The ratio for the euro area has been calibrated using monetary data for the 1999-2004 period, while the
ratio for the United States is taken from Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006).
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This appendix provides further details regarding the dynamic properties of the NAWM and
the transitional dynamics after reductions in ﬁrms’ social security contributions.
Figure C.1: Dynamic Responses to a Productivity Shock






































































NAWM: Real exchange rate
NAWM: Terms of trade
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM and the Smets-Wouters (SW, 2003) model, this ﬁgure depicts
the dynamic responses of selected domestic variables to a productivity shock equal to 1 percent of steady-
state output. For ease of comparison, the parameter governing its persistence is set equal to ρz =0 .90
uniformly across models. All dynamic responses are reported as percentage deviations from steady state,
except for the dynamic response of the real interest rate which is reported as percentage-point deviation.
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April 2007Figure C.2: Limited Asset-Market Participation and Government Spending Shocks





















































Note: For alternative sizes of household J, this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected domestic
variables to a government spending shock equal to 1 percent of steady-state output. All dynamic responses
are reported as percentage deviations from steady state.
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April 2007Figure C.3: Transitional Dynamics after an Instantaneous Reduction in Labour Cost







































































Real rental rate of capital
Real marginal cost
Note: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this ﬁgure depicts the transition dynamics of selected
domestic variables after an instantaneous permanent reduction in ﬁrms’ social security contributions from
21.9 to 7.1 percent. All dynamic eﬀects are reported as percentage deviations from the initial steady state,




Working Paper Series No 747 
April 200769
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 747
April 2007
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.int)
707  “Ramsey monetary policy with labour market frictions” by E. Faia, January 2007.
708  “Regional housing market spillovers in the US: lessons from regional divergences in a common monetary 
policy setting” by I. Vansteenkiste, January 2007.
709  “Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment” by P. Levine, P. McAdam 
and J. Pearlman, January 2007.
710  “Pricing of settlement link services and mergers of central securities depositories” by J. Tapking, 
January 2007.
711  “What “hides” behind sovereign debt ratings?” by A. Afonso, P. Gomes and P. Rother, January 2007.
712  “Opening the black box: structural factor models with large cross-sections” by M. Forni, D. Giannone, 
M. Lippi and L. Reichlin, January 2007.
713  “Balance of payment crises in emerging markets: how early were the “early” warning signals?” by M. Bussière, 
January 2007.
714  “The dynamics of bank spreads and financial structure” by R. Gropp, C. Kok Sørensen and J.-D. Lichtenberger, 
January 2007.
715  “Emerging Asia’s growth and integration: how autonomous are business cycles?” by R. Rüffer, M. Sánchez 
and J.-G. Shen, January 2007.
716  “Adjusting to the euro” by G. Fagan and V. Gaspar, January 2007.
717  “Discretion rather than rules? When is discretionary policy-making better than the timeless perspective?” 
by S. Sauer, January 2007.
718  “Drift and breaks in labor productivity” by L. Benati, January 2007.
719  “US imbalances: the role of technology and policy” by R. Bems, L. Dedola and F. Smets, January 2007.
720  “Real price wage rigidities in a model with matching frictions” by K. Kuester, February 2007.
721  “Are survey-based inflation expectations in the euro area informative?” by R. Mestre, February 2007.
722  “Shocks and frictions in US business cycles:  a Bayesian DSGE approach” by F. Smets and R. Wouters, 
February 2007.
723  “Asset allocation by penalized least squares” by S. Manganelli, February 2007.
724  “The transmission of emerging market shocks to global equity markets” by L. Cuadro Sáez, M. Fratzscher and 
C. Thimann, February 2007.
725  ”Inflation forecasts, monetary policy and unemployment dynamics: evidence from the US and the euro area”
by C.  Altavilla and M. Ciccarelli, February 2007.70
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 747 
April 2007
726  “Using intraday data to gauge financial market responses to Fed and ECB monetary policy decisions” 
by M. Andersson, February 2007. 
727  “Price setting in the euro area: some stylised facts from individual producer price data” by P. Vermeulen, 
D. Dias, M. Dossche, E. Gautier, I. Hernando, R. Sabbatini and H. Stahl, February 2007. 
728  “Price changes in Finland: some evidence from micro CPI data” by S. Kurri, February 2007. 
729  “Fast micro and slow macro: can aggregation explain the persistence of inflation?  ”
by F.  Altissimo, B. Mojon and P. Zaffaroni, February 2007. 
730  “What drives business cycles and international trade in emerging market economies?” 
by M. Sánchez, February 2007. 
731  “International trade, technological shocks and spillovers in the labour market:  a GVAR analysis of the 
US manufacturing sector” by P. Hiebert and I. Vansteenkiste, February 2007. 
732  “Liquidity shocks and asset price boom/bust cycles” by R. Adalid and C. Detken, February 2007.
733  “Mortgage interest rate dispersion in the euro area” by C. Kok Sørensen and J.-D. Lichtenberger, 
February 2007.
734  “Inflation risk premia in the term structure of interest rates” by P. Hördahl and O. Tristani, February 2007.
735  “Market based compensation, price informativeness and short-term trading” by R. Calcagno and F. Heider, 
February 2007.
736  “Transaction costs and informational cascades in financial markets: theory and experimental evidence” 
by M. Cipriani and A. Guarino, February 2007.
737  “Structural balances and revenue windfalls: the role of asset prices revisited” by R. Morris and L. Schuknecht, 
March 2007.
738  “Commodity prices, money and inflation” by F. Browne and D. Cronin, March 2007.
739  “Exchange rate pass-through in emerging markets” by M. Ca’ Zorzi, E. Hahn and M. Sánchez, March 2007.
740  “Transition economy convergence in a two-country model: implications for monetary integration” 
by J. Brůha and J. Podpiera, March 2007.
741  “Sectoral money demand models for the euro area based on a common set of determinants” 
by J. von Landesberger, March 2007.
742  “The Eurosystem, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan: similarities and differences” 
by D. Gerdesmeier, F. P. Mongelli and B. Roffia, March 2007.
743  “Credit market and macroeconomic volatility” by C. Mendicino, March 2007.
744  “International financial linkages of Latin American banks: the effects of political risk and deposit dollarisation” 
by F. Ramon-Ballester and T. Wezel, March 2007.
745  “Market discipline, financial integration and fiscal rules: what drives spreads in the euro area government 
bond market?” by S. Manganelli and G. Wolswijk, April 2007.71
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 747
April 2007
746  “U.S. evolving macroeconomic dynamics: a structural investigation” by L. Benati and H. Mumtaz, April 2007.
747  “Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area: a simulation-based analysis using the New 
Area-Wide Model” by G. Coenen, P. McAdam and R. Straub, April 2007.ISSN 1561081-0
9 771561 081005